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JEROME V. SIDEL
MEMORIAL LECTURE
THE CONSTITUTION: THE FRAMERS' INTENT, THE
PRESENT AND THE FUTURE
PHILIP B. KURLAND*
I should state at the outset that I am somewhat embarrassed by
the Paper that I am about to deliver. I am embarrassed for two rea-
sons. The first is that what I shall have to say really fits neither the title
assigned to me "The Constitution: The Framers' Intent, the Present
and the Future" nor the label put on the conference about the Consti-
tution in a new age of technology.
I really want to talk about what the Convention of 1787 put into
the document called the Constitution and why they did what they did.
Obviously, in the time allotted me I cannot by any means exhaust the
subject however much I may exhaust your patience. This embarrass-
ment is somewhat abated by the foresight of the sponsors who have
gathered a distinguished panel of jurists and jurisprudes who will more
than make up for my deficiencies.
The second cause for my discomfort is less easily cured. I feel
somewhat like a Philistine at the altar of the Temple. The Sidel Lec-
ture has established itself as a noted forum for the explication and ad-
vancement of what we have come to call civil liberties and civil rights,
or, sometimes, "minority rights." One of my difficulties as a constitu-
tionalist-if there is such a thing-is that I do not believe that minori-
ties have rights. Individuals have rights, whether they are members of
minorities or majorities. I am sure that whatever the special rights of
minorities may be-and they must exist because the Supreme Court,
the press, and academics talk of them all the time-they were not con-
ferred by the Constitution.
Indeed, although the watchword of the makers of the Constitution
* Professor Philip B. Kurland, professor at the University of Chicago, delivered
this paper at The Jerome V. Sidel Memorial Lecture at Washington University School
of Law in St. Louis, Missouri, on September 21, 1986.
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was "liberty," the Constitution itself created few if any rights for any-
one. What it did do was to establish a frame of government, a govern-
ment which was inhibited from invading the political and civil liberties
that were in 1787 the rights of Americans, however they came to exist
in the new American polity. How they came to exist is too long and
complex a story to be recited here, except to say that I do not think
natural law had anything to do with it. Unlike the French Revolution
which followed hard on our own achievement, the American Constitu-
tion-makers knew better than to attempt a catalogue of the rights of
man in a democratic republic. And so, we are still on our first republic,
while the French are on their fifth.
Read the Constitution. It will probably surprise you. You will see,
for example, that what has often been termed the most fundamental of
our civil rights, the right to habeas corpus, is not conferred by the Con-
stitution at all. What the Constitution says is that "The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it."1 Even the Bill
of Rights, which was not the appellation appended by its authors to the
first ten amendments, did not purport to create the most fundamental
rights. The rights of free speech and free press and freedom to worship
were not the government's to grant. The first amendment sought to see
to it that they were not the government's to take away. The fifth
amendment did not create a right to life, liberty, or property, it denied
government power to deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property, except
according to due process of law. The fourteenth amendment makes no
provision for equality; it protects only the right to "equal protection of
the laws." When the Constitution speaks of the "privileges and immu-
nities" of citizenship, it does so without anywhere defining what those
"privileges and immunities" might be, by connotation or denotation.
The fact is that, with a few exceptions, which need not detain us
here, the Constitution is concerned with procedure-procedural rights
if you will-and not with substance or substantive rights. Moreover, to
the extent that it deals with rights, it is concerned with the rights of
individuals, not classes or castes--or in the contemporary vernacular-
"minority rights." There is no right to arbitrarily impose burdens on or
deny benefits to members of a "majority" whatever that may be. The
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws belong to "per-
sons," all persons, and the privileges and immunities of which the Con-
stitution speaks are those of "citizens."
I have, however, gotten somewhat ahead of myself. Let me return
to the principles that were the concern of the Founding Fathers in the
document which they composed. I would draw a distinction you may
find picayune. It is that the Constitution is not the same as constitu-
I. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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tional law. You can read that sentence backwards or forwards. The
Constitution is a frame of government; constitutional law consists of a
series of judicial decisions purportedly based at least in part, but only
in part, on the fundamental document. The Constitution is both more
and less than constitutional law: it commands legislative and executive
behavior as well as judicial. But it lacks the detail and specificity that
courts may provide in their decisions. However plastic the provisions of
the Constitution may be, they are more substantial and long-lived than
any of the products even of the High Court. Suffice it to say here that
whatever the scope of the authority of the judicial branch to interpret
the Constitution's text and implications in the resolution of a particular
case or controversy before it, judicial decisions are not amendments to
the Constitution, they are but a gloss upon it. The Constitution can be
amended only by proposals put forth by extraordinary majorities of
representatives of the people and ratified by extraordinary majorities of
what are usually different representatives of the people, just as the
Constitution was proposed and ratified in the first place. A decision of
the Supreme Court may be reversed by a simple new majority of the
Supreme Court. Both processes of proposing and changing constitu-
tional provisions or readings must be indulged only with the greatest
circumspection if we are to have that continuity and the rule of reason
based on experience that alone can sustain what is the most fragile
form of government: a democratic republic, a representative democ-
racy.
The principal and primary objective of the 1787 Convention was
for the people to establish a mechanism for self-government. If liberty
of the individual were the goal of the Constitution-makers-and liberty
for them was not license-that liberty was to be maintained through
the structure of the new government. Government by the people was
not enough, however, for concentration of power, even in a democracy,
meant tyranny. Power for them was the ultimate antithesis of freedom.
The forces of government must not only be kept in the hands of the
people, none of it could be allowed to accumulate in any person, office,
or branch. Five-sixths of the Constitution is to be found in its first three
articles describing the limited powers to be exercised by the national
government. The powers of government were to be limited because to
the Founders the new national government was a necessity, not a good:
it was necessary to assure protection against external enemies and it
was a necessity to prevent internecine conflict that could sunder the
new nation and leave it vulnerable to conquest by internal and external
forces of tyranny. Surely there were those, like Hamilton, who dreamed
of empire even then. Even then there were some, like Hamilton, for
whom democracy was anathema. But for the time being-if only for
the time being-the Virginians proved capable of winning the battle,
even if the Hamiltonian creed has long since become dominant over the
Jeffersonian model.
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Self-government meant responsibility of government to the people
through short terms of office and legislative representation directly or
indirectly chosen by the people. The legislature was the body to which
government power was largely entrusted; there is no hint of an intent to
tolerate the maintenance of an executive prerogative. And the judiciary
was regarded then by all as little threat to their aspirations for popular
rule, because the judges had no authority over either the purse or the
army, the two principal forces by which democracy was thought to be
vulnerable to tyranny.
Governmental power being intrinsically the enemy of individual
liberty, the first three articles made multiple provisions for dispersing
power within the new government. Essentially two devices were used.
The first was federalism of a new kind, which allowed the national gov-
ernment to act directly on the people in some specified matters but
otherwise left the general governance of the people to the states. The
second was what we have come to mislabel "separation of powers," but
not in the simple sense that certain functions were legislative, others
executive, and some adjudicative. Not only were the powers of govern-
ment divided among three branches, but almost none was exercisable
solely at the discretion of any one branch. A system of checks and bal-
ances required the oversight of one branch by another. Lord Acton's
dictum was not pronounced until late into the nineteenth century. But
our eighteenth-century forebears well understood that power corrupts
and absolute power corrupts absolutely.'
It should not be forgotten that the role of government was a much
simpler one in 1787 and far short of what we regard as appropriate
government on this the eve of the bicentennial of the Constitution. The
difference may be marked by a comparison of Jefferson's inaugural ad-
dress with John Kennedy's, especially the words we have all admired
but seldom analyzed: "Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask
what you can do for your country." The fact is that, as government has
come to control more and more of the lives of American citizens, the
primitive devices written into the Constitution, limited government
powers, federalism, and separation of powers have become more or less
obsolete in assuring individual liberty as the prime objective of
government.
Federalism is dead. I do not mean that state and local govern-
ments have become redundant. Surely we are today as overburdened by
state and local regulations and bureaucracies as by national ones. What
I do mean is that there is no substantial governmental power that the
states can call their own; almost every governmental power that they
2. Lord Acton wrote in a letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, "Power tends to
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." J. ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND
POWER 364 (H. Finer ed. 1948).
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now exercise requires either the acquiescence or subsidy of national au-
thority. "What is necessary for the federal principle," K.C. Wheare
once wrote, "is not merely that the general government, like the re-
gional governments, should operate directly upon the people, but, fur-
ther, that each government should be limited to its own sphere, and
within that sphere, should be independent of each other."3 State gov-
ernments can no longer be said to be independent of national authority.
The loss of that independence started early in our history. It has never
been reversed. If, as the Founders certainly seemed to think, liberty of
the individual was dependent on preventing the concentration of gov-
ernment power, our liberties are more tenuous today than when govern-
mental authority over us was divided between the nation and the states.
If the second device for procuring liberty by limiting power, that
of separation of powers, is less than moribund, it can hardly be said to
remain vital. After a long period of legislative hegemony, of what
Woodrow Wilson when still a scholar described as Congressional Gov-
ernment, power has more and more left the hands of Congress and has
been concentrated more and more in the executive and its handmaiden,
the judiciary. Part of this is certainly due to the complexities of modern
government, which call for extensive administrative apparatus; part of
it is due to an abdication of function by Congress, which has become a
body without a head; and, in no small part, some of the change has
been due to a usurpation of function by the presidency. The result, as
Louis Heren wrote in his 1968 book The New American Com-
monweath is that
The modern American Presidency can be compared with the British
monarchy as it existed for a century or more after the signing of
magna carta in 1215 ...
Indeed, it can be said that the main difference between the modern
American President and a medieval monarch is that there has been
a steady increase rather than a diminution of his power. In compara-
tive historical terms the United States has been moving steadily
backward.4
Nor has the role of the Supreme Court been a glorious one in the
defense of the ideal of separation of powers. With perhaps but two ma-
jor exceptions, the first, The Steel Seizure Case,5 where the Court
ruled for Congress over the President and the second, The Nixon Tapes
Case,6 where the Court ruled for the judiciary over the executive, the
Court has, since the Civil War, almost always approved the vast trans-
3. K. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 15 (3d ed. 2d impression 1956).
4. L. HEREN, THE NEW AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 8-9 (1969).
5. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
6. Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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fers of Congressional power, approved the exercise of authority in the
legislative field by the executive, and forbidden Congress even the pre-
tense of a role in the administration of the laws which it enacts, usually
at the behest of the executive branch. I think that this pattern of power
bodes ill for freedom. With Mr. Justice Jackson in The Steel Seizure
Case, I would submit that: "With all its defects, delays and inconve-
niences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free gov-
ernment except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law
be made by parliamentary deliberations.''
In addition to its republican form of representative government,
federalism, and separation of powers, the Founders would have pro-
tected the individual liberty by another device immanent rather than
explicit in the original document. Underlying the entire structure was
the English notion, later to be labelled the "rule of law." This was the
essence of that amorphous conception called the English Constitution,
or what our forefathers referred to as the rights of Englishmen. Specifi-
cally, it included the idea that whatever laws were promulgated even
by an omnipotent Parliament, they were to be applied equally to every-
one; the laws were to be created and enforced by an established proce-
dure which foreclosed the arbitrary exercise of will, whether by legisla-
tors, executives, or judges; and the laws were not to be applied
retroactively to actions or events that occurred before they were made
known to those to whom they were to be applied. Some of these
precepts were, in fact, specifically written into the Constitution, as in
its ban on impairment of contracts and ex post facto laws, in its fore-
closure of bills of attainder, in its definition of treason, in the various
provisions for criminal trials, and the provision for the equal protection
of the laws. But the rule of law was broader than any or all of these.
And the particular American contribution was one which the British
themselves have never adopted, the idea of judicial review. If you read
the records of the debates at the 1787 Convention and the ratifying
conventions and the debates "out of doors," as they said, you will find a
general assumption that there would be judicial review-in the context
of a case or controversy, even if you would be hard put to find its justi-
fication in any specific language of the Constitution itself. You will
find, too, a general expectation of the survival of the basic principles of
the common law, among them trial by jury, habeas corpus, and the
privilege against self-incrimination.
Certainly the rule of law has survived in greater vigor than either
federalism or separation of powers as a protector of individual liberties.
Not that it, too, has not suffered the ravages of time and the sophistries
of Supreme Court judgments. Try to find, if you will, for example, re-
cent evidence of bans on retroactive legislation or inhibitions on that
7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 655.
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kind of wilfullness that makes for a government of men and not of
laws, especially in the administrative law area. But on the whole the
individual liberty sought to be assured by the machinery of the Consti-
tution has been less dependent on the terms of the Constitution than on
the spirit in which it has been invoked.
The best hope of the Founders for a government that would pre-
serve the liberties of the citizenry lay in their provision that the new
government would be of the citizens and by the citizens and hopefully
for the citizens. With classes and castes abolished, the self-interest of
some citizens would necessarily be the self-interest of all citizens, under
two conditions. First, that the rule of law prevailed and the same rule
that applied to anyone would be applied to everyone. Second, that the
citizens who chose among themselves for their governors would make it
their business to be well informed in their choices of men and about the
business those men entered upon. Even so, they understood both the
need to limit the authority of any man or office, lest the corruption of
power they had witnessed in their motherland also take over in their
new nation. They recognized, too, that there were strong forces that
made for a need to deal with local problems in terms related to local
interests.
These drafters of the Constitution were sophisticated people. They
had examined closely the histories of many societies that had formed
governments before them. Perhaps a poll of the fifty-six conventioners
would not have revealed great expectation for a very long-lived national
government, at least of one maintaining the same form with which it
was begun. But underlying the enterprise was a faith that they were
building a new order for mankind that the entire world would do well
to emulate. The faith was not so much in the words of the master docu-
ment as in the goal it was meant to achieve: individual liberty under
law. As Learned Hand put it, almost sixty years ago:
[Liberty] is the product, not of institutions, but of a temper, of an
attitude towards life; of that mood that looks before and after and
pines for what is not. It is idle to look to laws, or courts, or principal-
ities, or powers, to secure it. You may write into your constitutions
not ten, but fifty amendments, and it shall help not a farthing, for
casuistry will undermine it as casuistry should, if it have no stay but
law. It is secure only ... in that sense of fair play, of give and take,
of the uncertainty of human hypothesis, of how changeable and
passing are our surest convictions, which has so hard a chance to
survive in any times, perhaps especially our own. 8
That last note-"especially our own"-chills me. For, as we are
about to celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of the Constitution, I
find that the George Babbitts and the Elmer Gantrys are again loose in
8. L. HAND, Sources of Tolerance, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 66, 77 (1952).
19871
HeinOnline  -- 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 23 1987-1988
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
our land. Even, or perhaps especially in the halls of government there
seems to be a spirit abroad that is based on an unwarranted self-right-
eousness, a certitude that rejects all doubts, a formula that prescribes
that all who refuse to follow the leader must be regarded as enemies of
the administration, enemies of the state, and enemies of the people. We
have as a people legitimate historical claims on such attitudes: they
burned witches in old England as well as in New England. Indeed,
Harvard in its three-hundred and fiftieth anniversary year in its alumni
bulletin proudly displays a representation of Cotton Mather, "A.B.
1678", encouraging the hanging of George Burrough, "A.B. 1670", for
what the great divine Cotton Mather regarded as heterodoxy and
called witchcraft. And we have had the Dred Scott9 case and Senator
Joseph McCarthy and Attorney General Mitchell Palmer and the
"Know-Nothing" Party to afford but a few reminders of the conse-
quences of "The Sleep of Reason."
If we are to celebrate two centuries of the American Constitution,
let us do so by reviving that "spirit of liberty" which, to use Learned
Hand's words again,
is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right; the spirit of liberty
is the spirit which seeks to understand the minds of other men and
women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which weighs their interests
alongside its own without bias; the spirit of liberty remembers that
not even a sparrow falls to earth unheeded; the spirit of liberty is the
spirit of Him who, nearly two thousand years ago, taught mankind
that lesson it never learned, but has never quite forgotten; that there
may be a kingdom where the least shall be heard and considered
side by side with the greatest.'
It was this spirit of liberty that was revealed in the making of the
Constitution two hundred years ago; it is this spirit of liberty that has
maintained American constitutionalism for two centuries. The words of
the document are important, but they have life only through this spirit.
I would remind you that there was nothing intrinsically lacking in the
provisions of the Constitution of the Weimer Republic except a histori-
cal commitment by the people of Germany to the kind of faith that
created and maintained our own. Our future depends not so much on
new amendments or new Supreme Court decisions as on a renewed
common commitment to the Constitution's original purpose: "one Na-
tion indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."
The revolution that culminated in the Constitution of 1787 was
not a political revolution: at least it did not dismiss one political faction
to be replaced by another. It was not an economic revolution: the distri-
bution of wealth and the means of acquiring it remained unchanged. It
9. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857).
10. L. HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189, 190 (1952).
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was not a religious revolution: no dominant belief or sect replaced an-
other, rather the role of religion in government was virtually elimi-
nated. It was not a social revolution: the classes were already too inde-
terminate and too malleable to recognize any castes or estates. It was a
humanistic revolution: it was the beginning of a government to be con-
cerned with man's humanity towards man. The Constitution marked
the point when the nation consciously began-to use Oliver Wendell
Holmes' phrase-"to become more civilized," not more efficient, not
more powerful, not necessarily more knowledgeable, certainly not more
saintly, just more civilized. We began two hundred years ago and per-
haps our goal will never be fully achieved. But it is our hope for salva-
tion in the future, and the Constitution can serve-if we choose-as
our guidepost.
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